Files
api_health/agent/infra/tools/web/url_guard.js
T
likandtrae-solo-agent 1774239553 fix: 收紧 agent 出网与数据隔离
SSRF 校验补 DNS 解析与每一跳重校验,重定向手动跟随,超时夹紧、响应体截断 2MB;订单工具改用 userId 隔离并转义正则;沙箱固定拦截 .git/.env/密钥文件;环境变量脱敏改为命名模式兜底并删除 env_set。
2026-10-24 22:04:59 +08:00

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JavaScript
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/**
* 出网 URL 安全校验(SSRF 防护)
*
* Agent 的 HTTP 工具处理的 URL 来自模型输出,而模型输入含不可信的用户内容,
* 因此可能被诱导去访问环回/内网地址(如本机 127.0.0.1 上的其他服务、云元数据地址)。
*
* 两层校验:
* 1. checkUrlAllowed —— 同步校验协议与字面量主机(覆盖直接写内网 IP 的情况);
* 2. checkUrlAllowedAsync —— 再对域名做 DNS 解析,逐个校验解析结果
* (覆盖「公网域名解析到内网地址」的绕过)。仅做同步校验是不够的。
*/
import dns from "dns/promises";
import net from "net";
// 仅允许的协议
const ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS = ["http:", "https:"];
// 本地主机名
const BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES = new Set(["localhost", "localhost.localdomain", "ip6-localhost"]);
/**
* 是否为内网/保留 IPv4 地址
* @param {string} host 形如 10.0.0.1 的地址
*/
function isPrivateIPv4(host) {
const parts = host.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
const nums = parts.map((p) => (/^\d+$/.test(p) ? Number(p) : NaN));
if (nums.some((n) => !Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return false;
const [a, b] = nums;
if (a === 0 || a === 10 || a === 127) return true; // 当前网络/内网/环回
if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true; // 100.64.0.0/10 运营商级 NAT
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true; // 169.254.0.0/16 链路本地(含云 metadata)
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true; // 172.16.0.0/12
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true; // 192.168.0.0/16
if (a === 192 && b === 0) return true; // 192.0.0.0/24 IETF 保留
if (a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19)) return true; // 198.18.0.0/15 基准测试
if (a >= 224) return true; // 组播与保留段
return false;
}
/**
* 是否为内网/保留 IPv6 地址
* @param {string} host 不带方括号的 IPv6 地址
*/
function isPrivateIPv6(host) {
const h = host.toLowerCase();
if (h === "::1" || h === "::") return true;
if (/^f[cd]/.test(h)) return true; // 唯一本地 fc00::/7
if (/^fe[89ab]/.test(h)) return true; // 链路本地 fe80::/10
// IPv4 映射地址:URL 会把 ::ffff:127.0.0.1 规范化成 ::ffff:7f00:1
const mapped = h.match(/^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
if (mapped) return isPrivateIPv4(mapped[1]);
const mappedHex = h.match(/^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/);
if (mappedHex) {
const hi = parseInt(mappedHex[1], 16);
const lo = parseInt(mappedHex[2], 16);
return isPrivateIPv4(`${hi >> 8}.${hi & 255}.${lo >> 8}.${lo & 255}`);
}
// NAT64 64:ff9b::/96 同样内嵌 IPv4
const nat64 = h.match(/^64:ff9b::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/);
if (nat64) {
const hi = parseInt(nat64[1], 16);
const lo = parseInt(nat64[2], 16);
return isPrivateIPv4(`${hi >> 8}.${hi & 255}.${lo >> 8}.${lo & 255}`);
}
return false;
}
/**
* 是否为内网/保留地址(IPv4 或 IPv6 字面量)
* @param {string} address IP 地址
*/
function isPrivateAddress(address) {
return net.isIP(address) === 6 ? isPrivateIPv6(address) : isPrivateIPv4(address);
}
/**
* 同步校验 URL:协议、字面量主机、内网 IP
* @param {string} url 待校验的 URL
* @returns {string|null} 不允许时返回原因文案,允许时返回 null
*/
function checkUrlAllowed(url) {
let parsed;
try {
parsed = new URL(url);
} catch (e) {
return `Invalid URL: ${url}`;
}
if (!ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS.includes(parsed.protocol)) {
return `Blocked protocol: ${parsed.protocol}`;
}
// URL.hostname 对 IPv6 会带方括号,统一去掉并转小写
const hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();
if (BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES.has(hostname)) {
return `Blocked host: ${hostname}`;
}
if (isPrivateAddress(hostname)) {
return `Blocked private network address: ${hostname}`;
}
return null;
}
/**
* 先同步校验,再解析域名并逐个校验解析结果
* @param {string} url 待校验的 URL
* @returns {Promise<string|null>} 不允许时返回原因文案,允许时返回 null
*/
async function checkUrlAllowedAsync(url) {
const blocked = checkUrlAllowed(url);
if (blocked) return blocked;
const hostname = new URL(url).hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();
if (net.isIP(hostname)) return null; // 字面量地址已在同步阶段校验
let addresses;
try {
addresses = await dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true });
} catch (e) {
return `DNS lookup failed: ${hostname}`;
}
if (!addresses.length) return `DNS lookup returned no address: ${hostname}`;
for (const { address } of addresses) {
if (isPrivateAddress(address)) {
return `Blocked private network address: ${hostname} -> ${address}`;
}
}
return null;
}
export {
checkUrlAllowed,
checkUrlAllowedAsync,
isPrivateAddress,
isPrivateIPv4,
isPrivateIPv6,
};